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INEQUALITY IN MARITAL LIABILITIES: 
THE NEED FOR EQUAL PROTECTION 
WHEN MODIFYING THE NECESSARIES 
DOCTRINE 
Under the common law doctrine of necessaries, if a husband neglects 
to furnish necessaries 1 to his wife, she may purchase them herself on 
his credit. 2 This doctrine was once widely accepted3 as necessary to 
I. Although the common law originally narrowly defined necessaries to mean only such basic 
items as food, drink, clothing, and shelter, this definition has been expanded to include all things 
necessary and suitable, given the spouses' status and condition in life. See, e.g., Anderson v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 45 Ala. App. 105, 226 So. 2d 166 (1969); Chipp v. Murray, 191 Kan. 73, 
379 P.2d 297 (1963); Smith v. Smith, 255 N.C. 152, 120 S.E.2d 575 (1961); see also 2 R. LEE, 
NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW§ 132 (3d ed. 1963) (factors to be considered in each case include: 
the status, earning capacity and wealth of the husband; the customs and fashions of the time; 
and the general standard of living). For examples of what have been held to be necessaries other 
than the basic items of food, drink, clothing, and shelter, see McCormick v. Sexton, 239 Ark. 
29, 386 S.W.2d 930 (1965) (funeral expenses); Fenters v. Fenters, 238 Ga. 131, 231 S.E.2d 741 
(1977) (legal expenses incurred in divorce proceeding); Rubin v. Rubin, 233 Md. 118, 195 A.td 
696 (1963) (fees wife paid to private detective hired to obtain evidence to use against her husband 
in divorce case); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E. 350 (1922) (furniture 
and other household goods); Bowes v. Bowes, 43 N.C. App. 586,259 S.E.2d 389 (1979) (medical 
expenses); State v. Clark, 88 Wash. 2d 533, 563 P.2d 1253 (1977) (legal expenses incurred to 
defend against a criminal charge that could result in incarceration). But see .Chipp v. Murray, 
191 Kan. 73, 379 P.2d 297 (1963) (fees wife paid to detective hired to discover evidence against 
her husband on which to base a separation action are not necessaries); Johnson & Maxwell, 
Ltd. v. Lind, 288 N.W.2d 763 (N.D. 1980) (legal costs incurred during divorce are not necessaries). 
2. See Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955); Sillery v. Fagan, 120 N.J. Super. 
416, 294 A.2d 624 (1972); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner, 69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d 689 
(Dist. Ct. 1972); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 246 Pa. Super. 455, 371 A.2d 925 (1977); H. CLARK, THE 
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 6.3 (1968). 
3. See, e.g., A. & W. Hughes v. Chadwick, 6 Ala. 651 (1844); Schlothan v. Schlothan, 5 
Alaska 162 (1914); Beverly v. Nance, 145 Ark. 589, 224 S.W. 956 (1920); Davis v. Fyfe, 107 
Cal. App. 281, 290 P. 468 (1930); Stokes v. Dollard, 94 Colo. 206, 29 P.2d 706 (1934); Cohn 
v. Snyder, 102 Conn. 703, 130 A. 100 (1925); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159 A. 
846 (1932); Phillips v. Sanchez, 35 Fla. 187, 17 So. 363 (1895); Morrison v. Evans, 31 Ga. App. 
256, 120 S.E. 430 (1923); Ing v. Chung, 34 Hawaii 709 (1938); Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 
645, 92 P. 842 (1907); Abrams v. Traster, 244 Ill. App. 533 (1927); Litson v. Brown, 26 Ind. 
489 (1866); Descelles v. Kadmus, 8 Iowa 51 (1859); Frisby v. Hladky, 139 Kan. 517, 31 P.2d 
1001 (1934); Billing v. Pilcher & Hauser, 46 Ky. 458 (1847); Schaeffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 
115 So. 575 (1928); Furlong v. Hysom, 35 Me. 332 (1853); Stonesifer v. Shriver, 100 Md. 24, 
59 A. 139 (1904); Shaw v. Thompson, 33 Mass. 198 (1834); Annis v. Manthey, 234 Mich. 347, 
208 N.W. 453 (1926); Carr v. Anderson, 154 Minn. 162, 191 N.W. 407 (1923); Galtney v. Wood, 
149 Miss. 56, 115 So. 117 (1928); County of Audrain v. Muir, 297 Mo. 499, 249 S.W. 383 
(1923); McQuay v. McQuay, 86 Mont. 535, 284 P. 532 (1930); Acton·v. Schoenauer, 121 Neb. 
62, 236 N.W. 140 (1931); Jewell v. Jewell, 53 Nev. 97, 292 P. 616 (1930); Ott v. Hentall, 70 
N.H. 231, 47 A. 80 (1899); Asche v. Wakely, 112 N.J. Eq. 60, 163 A. 278 (1932); Chevallier 
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protect dependent wives and is based on the husband's general duty 
to support his wife and family. 4 Recent economic and _legal 
developments, however, have required a reconsideration of the 
necessaries doctrine; the increasing independence of women and the 
Supreme Court's insistence that men and women be treated equally5 
have led many courts and legislatures to modify this doctrine. 6 Most 
of the modifications implemented are gender neutral and comply with 
the Supreme Court's decisions on gender discrimination. 7 One modifica-
tion, however, continues to treat husbands and wives unequally by 
holding the husband primarily liable and the wife secondarily liable 
for all debts incurred by the couple for necessaries. 8 Despite the ob-
v. Connors, 33 N.M. 93, 262 P. 173 (1927); Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N.Y. 75, 68 N.E. 135 
(1903); Bowen v.· Daugherty, 168 N.C. 242, 84 S.E. 265 (1915); Badger v. Orr, I Ohio App. 
293 (1913); Schiefer v. Wilson, 171 Okla. 119, 42 P.2d 263 (1935); Taylor v. Taylor, 54 Or. 
560, 103 P. 524 (1909); Moore v. Copley, 165 Pa. 294, 30 A. 829 (1895); Marshall v. Perkins, 
20 R.I. 34, 37 A. 301 (1897); Scates v. Canvas Decoy Co., 5 Tenn. App. 695 (1927); Crosby 
v. A. Harris & Co., 234 S.W. 127 (fex. Civ. App. 1921); Joseph Frost & Co. v. Willis, 13 
Vt. 202 (1841); Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S.E. 704 (1921); Hinton Dep't Co. v. 
Lilly, 105 W. Va. 126, 141 S.E. 629 (1928); Lichtenberger v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 197 Wis. 
336, 222 N.W. 218 (1928). The majority of these cases are no longer followed, having been 
either expressly or implicitly overruled by statute or case law. For those states that still adhere 
to the common law doctrine, see infra note 17. 
4. The common law doctrine provided a means of enforcing the husband's support obliga-
tion. See generally H. Cl.ARK, supra note 2, § 6.1 (1968). This obligation arose out of the marital 
relationship, see, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 27 Ill. App. 2d 24, 169 N.E.2d 172 (1960); Gorco 
Constr. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 479 n.7, 99 N.W.2d 69, 73 n.7 (1959), and was based on the 
view that performance of the wife's marital duties was consideration for the obligation, see, 
e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940); In re Sonnicksen's Estate, 23 
Cal. App. 2d 475, 73 P.2d 643 (1937). 
The common law did not, however, impose a duty of support on the wife. As a result, she 
could not be held liable for necessaries furnished to her family. See, e.g., Mergenthaler v. Mergen-
thaler, 69 Cal. App. 2d 525, 160 P .2d 121 (1945); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159 
A. 846 (1932); Truax v. Ellett, 234 Iowa 1217, 15 N.W.2d 361 (1944). 
5. Historically the Supreme Court has shown great deference to the legislature's decision 
to adopt a gender-based classification. In recent years, however, the Court has begun to scrutinize 
closely such classifications to determine their constitutionality under the equal protection clause. 
See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text; see also Loewy, Returned to the Pedestal - The 
Supreme Court and Gender Classification Cases: 1980 Term, 60 N.C.L. REv. 87 (1981); The 
Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REv. I, 177-88 (1977). The Court's demand for equal 
treatment applies even where the laws are designed to benefit women if, by according differential 
treatment to women, the law is reinforcing traditional stereotypes that tend to place women in 
a subordinate position. See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. See generally L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-24 to -26 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357, 1359 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the support obligation of the wife is coequal with that 
of the husband); Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, __ Ind.App. __ , 430 N.E.2d 412, 416 (1982) 
(holding the wife primarily liable for her own expenses); Condore v. Prince George's County, 
Md., 289 Md. 516, 530-32, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981) (holding the common law doctrine of 
necessaries invalid after passage of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment). 
7. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g., Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976); Klump v. Klump, 
96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 (1954); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 
N.W.2d 326 (1982). 
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vious inequality of this "primary/secondary" modification, no court 
has struck it down.9 
This Note contends that the "primary/secondary" modification is 
unconstitutional10 because it ignores the husband's equal protection 
rights while unlawfully stigmatizing women as dependent. Part I 
discusses how the growing independence of women has led courts to 
modify the common law doctrine. Part II develops the test that the 
Supreme Court would apply in judging the constitutionality of any 
modification of the doctrine. Part III applies this test to the 
"primary/secondary" modification and concludes that the modification 
is unconstitutional and, therefore, not a legitimate reformation of the 
common law necessaries doctrine. 
I. THE CoNDmONS DEMANDING REFORM OF THE COMMON 
LAW RULE AND THE :RESULTING MODIFICATIONS 
Implicit in the common law doctrine is the assumption that the wife 
depended upon her husband to provide for her financial needs. This 
dependency was unavoidable due to the legal and economic disabilities 
imposed on wives by the common law. Typically, at common law the 
husband acquired rights to all of his wife's property immediately upon 
marriage. 11 Consequently, the wife was entirely without personal assets 
9. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 10S Wis. 2d S06, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982). Although 
it appears that only the Wisconsin courts have acknowledged the constitutional problem, it un-
questionably exists because "statutory classifications that distinguish between males and females 
are 'subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.'" Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
197 (1976) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 7S (1971)). Furthermore, although Craig and 
Reed involved statutory classifications, the required scrutiny applies"equally to judicial action. 
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880). 
10. This Note does not specifically address the constitutionality of the common law doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the arguments regarding the constitutionality of the modification also can be ap-
plied to the common law doctrine. Indeed, at least five states have rejected the common law 
doctpne as unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. See Condore v. Prince George's 
County, Md., 289 Md. S16, S30, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018 (1981); Jersey Shore Medical Center-
Fitkin Hosp. _v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 147-48, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980); Kilbourne 
v. Hanzelik, 648 S.W.2d 932 (Tenn. 1983); Schilling v. Bedford County Memorial Hosp., __ 
Va. _ 303 S.E.2d 90S (1983). Similarly, the Georgia legislature repealed Georgia's codified 
necessaries doctrine, GA. CooE ANN.§ S3-S10 (1974), in order to "comply with those standards 
of equal protection under the law announced in •.. Orr v. Orr[, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)).'' Act 
of April 4, 1979, 1979 Ga. Laws 466, 469. · 
11. H. CLARK, supra note 2, § 7.1. Although the passage of the Married Woman's Property 
Acts removed many of the common law disabilities by allowing married women to have their 
own separate estates, bring suits, and enter contracts, id. § 7.2, as a practical matter, some 
dependency remained, see Amsler, The New Ma"ied Woman's Statutes: Meaning and Effect, 
15 BAYLOR L. ~- 14S, 149-S3 (1963) (under Texas law, although a wife may unilaterally sell 
her separate property and contract for goods in her own name, the purchaser or creditor may 
continue to require her husband's joinder); Comment, Marital Property: A New Look at Old 
Inequalities, 39 ALB. L. REv. 52, S4-S6, 61-62, 70-73 (1974) (as a practical matter, most wives 
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and unable even to provide the consideration necessary to enter 
contracts. 12 
'J'.oday, however, many wives are not dependent upon their husbands13 
and courts can no longer presume a need to provide them with finan-
cial protection. Not only do a significant number of married women 
work outside the home14 and contribute jointly with their husbands 
to the family resources, 15 in some marriages the wife is the sole 
provider. 16 This change in marital roles, along with the growing 
awareness that the law requires equal treatment of men and women, 
has led most courts and legislatures to view the common law necessaries 
doctrine as an anachronism demanding reform. 11 
are in no better position as a result of the Property Acts than they were under the common 
law). Moreover, the passage of the Acts typically did not relieve the husband of his duty of 
support. See, e.g., In re Tunison's Estate, 75 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1948); Loveman, Joseph 
& Loeb, Inc. v. Rogers, 39 Ala. App. 162, 96 So. 2d 691 (1957); Stein v. Woodward & Lothrop, 
77 A.2d 564 (D.C. 1950). Rather, liability continued to be imposed on the husband for all goods 
purchased by the wife unless she evidenced a clear intention to bind her separate estate. See, 
e.g., Herring v. Holden, 88 Ga. App. 212, 76 S.E.2d 515 (1953); New York Tel. Co. v. Teichner, 
69 Misc. 2d 135, 329 N.Y.S.2d 689 (Dist. Ct. 1972). 
12. See H. Cl.ARK, supra note 2, § 7.1. 
13. In March 1981, both husband and wife worked in 520/o of all married-couple families. 
See Hayghe, Marital and family patterns of workers: an update, MONTHLY LAB. REv., May 1982, 
at 53, 55 table 4; see also Kamerman, Child care and family benefits: policies of six industrial-
ized countries, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Nov. 1980, at 23. ("Our country's most prevalent family 
type is now the two-parent, two-wage-earner family."). The increasing number of working wives 
is likely to continue. It has been projected that two-thirds of the labor force growth between 
1980-1995 will be generated by women. See Fullerton, The 1995 labor force: a first look, MONTHLY 
LAB. REv., Dec. 1980, at 11. 
14. Fifty-one percent of all married women with husbands present were part of the labor 
force in March 1981. See Hayghe, supra note 13, at 54 table I. 
15. In 1978, the average amount of the family income attributed to the wife's earnings was 
260/o. See Johnson, Marital and family characteristics of the labor force, March 1979, MONTHLY 
LAB. REv., Apr. 1980, at 48. 
16. In 1981, the wife was the only wage earner in almost three and one-half percent of married-
couple families. See Hayghe, supra note 13. 
17. See, e.g., Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 
147-49, 417 A.2d 1003, 1008-09 (1980) ("The common law rule imposing liability on husbands, 
but not wives, is an anachronism that no longer fits contemporary society .... The common 
law must adapt to the progress ·of women in achieving economic equality and to the mutual 
sharing of all obligations by husbands and wives."); see also Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. 
v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1357-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 
__ Ind. App. __ , 430 N.E.2d 412, 413 (1982); Condore v. Prince George's County, Md., 
289 Md. 516, 530-32, 425 A.2d 1011, 1018-19 (1981). 
A few states continue to explicitly follow the common law doctrine. See, e.g., Automobile 
Club Ins. Co. v. Lainhart, 609 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (relying on the statutory codification 
of the common law embodied in KY. REv. STAT. § 404.040 (1972)); In re Dupont, 19 Bankr. 
605_(E.D.N.Y. 1982); Bowes v. Bowes, 43 N.C. App. 586,259 S.E.2d 389 (1979). Some states 
have not addressed the issue recently, but appear to adhere to the common Jaw. See, e.g., Green 
v. First Nat'! Bank, 49 Ala. App. 426, 272 So. 2d 895 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 290 Ala. 
14, 272 So. 2d 901 (1972); Parkinson v. Hammond, 35 Del. 145, 159 A. 846 (1932) (cited with 
apparent approval in Hyland v. Southwell, 320 A.2d 767 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974)); Banker v. 
Dodge, 126 Vt. 534, 237 A.2d 121 (1967). In still other states it appears that the common law 
rule, while not explicitly overruled, may no longer be followed given the courts' treatment of 
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Four basic modifications of this doctrine have resulted. 18 The most 
common modification holds ~oth spouses jointly and severally liable 
for all necessary expenses. This modification has generally been im-
posed by statute and appears primarily in states that have adopted an 
Equal Rights Amendment. 19 At the other extreme, Maryland courts 
hold neither spouse liable for necessaries furnished to the other in the 
absence of an express or implied contract. 20 A third modification holds 
each spouse primarily liable for the debts he or she incurs for necessaries 
and holds the other spouse secondarily liable. 21 These modifications 
are, on their face, gender neutral, 22 and no question arises as to their 
constitutionality in this regard under the equal protection clause. 23 
The fourth modification provides that a husband is always primar-
ily liable and a wife always secondarily liable for all debts incurred 
analogous situations. Compare Trotter v. Minnis, 199 Ark. 924, 136 S.W.2d 463 (1940) and 
Brown v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226, 116 A. 451 (1922) (both recognizing the common law rule) 
with Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) (awarding of attorney's fees 
in divorce proceeding is discretionary with the court and dependent upon financial abilities of 
the parties) and Beal v. Beal, 388 A.2d 72 (Me. 1978) (alimony statute allowing for support 
of wives only is an unconstitutional denial of men's equal protection rights). 
18. There are a few minor exceptions to these basic patterns. The principle variation is found 
in some community property states where necessaries are considered to be debts of the marital 
community and are first satisfied with community property. In the absence of sufficient com-
munity property, however, one of the four modifications will be applied. See A.Riz. REv. ST~T-
ANN. § 25-215 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.090 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-11 (1978). 
Another variation is found in Massachusetts, where the wife is liable for necessaries up to the 
amount of $JOO but only if she has property worth at least $2000. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 
209, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1981). If the wife does not own $2000 of property, the common law 
will be applied. 
19. These statutes have generally been of two types: Family Expense Acts held to include 
necessaries, see CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 14-6-110 (1973) (ERA); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 1015 (1979) 
(ERA); IowA CODE ANN.§ 597.14 (West 1981) (no ERA); WASH. REv. CODE§ 26-16-205 (1981) 
(ERA), and statutes which were enacted to deal specifically with the question of necessaries, 
see HAWAII REY. STAT.§ 573-7 (Supp. 1982) (ERA); MONT. CoDE ANN. § 40-2-102 (1981) (ERA). 
In addition, Mississippi has adopted this modification judicially. See Cooke v. Adams, 183 So. 
2d 925 (Miss. 1966) (no ERA). 
20. See Condore v. Prince George's County, Md., 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981). 
21. See Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, __ Ind.App._, 430 N.E.2d 412 (1982); Busch v. 
Busch Constr., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Jersey Shore Medical Center-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate 
of Baum, 84 N.J. 137, 417 A.2d 1003 (1980); see also Manatee Convalescent Center, Inc. v. 
McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a legislatively mandated 
gender-neutral duty of support requires that both spouses be responsible for the other's necessaries 
but expressly leaving open the question of whether the spouse not incurring the debt is liable 
only if the spouse incurring the debt is unable to pay). 
22. In other words, these classifications do not provide for different treatment of males and 
females on the basis of their gender. 
23. This does not preclude the possibility that these modifications may violate the equal pro-
tection clause because of some discriminatory effect unrelated to gender. Without actual gender 
discrimination, however, these modifications would be scrutinized under the more lenient ra-
tional basis test, thereby virtually guaranteeing their constitutionality under the equal protection 
clause. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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by either spouse for necessaries. 24 This modification differs from the 
others because it continues the common law practice of imposing an 
unequal share of financial responsibility upon the husband. Conse-
quently, this modification fails to promote the equal treatment of men 
and women demanded by modern social and legal conditions. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF 
GENDER-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court applied a rational basis test25 to 
determine the constitutionality of any law26 providing for different treat-
ment of men and women. Under this test, which continues to be used 
in cases of economic and social welfare legislation, the Court upholds 
all laws reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. 21 Because 
broad deference is usually given to the legislative determination of 
whether a law is reasonably related to a government purpose, most 
laws challenged under this test are upheld. 28 
Early application of this test to laws basing treatment on gender was 
in accord with prevailing legal and social views of women. 29 By nature, 
24. At least six states have adopted this view either by statute or judicial decree: Page v. 
Welfare Comm'r, 170 Conn. 2S8, 36S A.2d 1118 (1976) (interpreting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-37 
(1981)); NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 42-201 (1978}; Klump v. Klump, 96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 
(19S4} (interpreting Omo R.Ev. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Baldwin 1982}}; OKLA. STAT. tit. 32, § 
3 (1981}; W. VA. CODE § 48-3-22 (1980}; Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d S06, 314 
N.W.2d 326 (1982). 
2S. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-24, at 1060 (until the 1970's, gender classifications were 
upheld whenever they were reasonably related to a governmental purpose}. 
26. Whether the claim is brought against a state or federal law is insignificant. Although 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies only to states, the Supreme 
Court has held that there is an implicit federal equal protection component in the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (19S4}. Moreover, the 
equal protection analysis under either amendment is identical. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 93 (1976} (per curiam); see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 518 (1978} [hereinafter cited as NOWAK]. 
27. See L. TRIBE, supra note S, §§ 16-2 to -5. 
28. This test assumes the validity of the legislature's judgment in creating the classification. 
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 42S-26 (1960). The Court grants this deference because 
judges have no greater capability than legislators to assess the reasonableness of social and economic 
legislation. NOWAK, supra note 26, at S24. In exercising this deference, the Court may even 
consider possible legislative purposes other than those articulated. See, e.g., Fleming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 611-12 (1960). But see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, ZT0 (1973) (the Court's 
only inquiry is whether the "challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated 
state purpose"}. Consequently the Court will uphold a classification if there is any conceivable 
set of facts supporting it. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 426; Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Because of this deference, the rational basis test 
has been described as requiring "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). 
29. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 16-24. 
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women were considered too delicate for many occupations in civil life. 
In addition, most. members of society felt that a woman,s obligation 
was to the home and family. 30 To-fulfill this obligation, many lawmakers 
believed that women needed special legal protections. 31 Application of 
the rational basis test allowed legislatures to pass such protections freely32 
and reflected the general societal consensus that they were appropriate. 
During the-1970,s, however, the Court began to recognize that the 
changing role of women demanded application of a more stringent test. 33 
Socially, women were gaining an equal footing with men, and laws 
discriminating against them or stereotyping them as domestic were· no 
longer considered appropriate. 34 Yet because gender-based discrimina-
tion had strong roots in social conventions and lacked the invidiousness 
of other forms of discrimination, such as racial discrimination, 35 the 
Court was reluctant to overturn these laws under the same strict 
scrutiny36 analysis used in these other cases. Rather, the Court sought 
30. Id.; see also Bradwell v. State: 
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . • . The paramount destiny and· 
mission of women are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This 
is the law of the Creator. 
83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872). 
31. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish: 
[A] woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her 
at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence .•. [H]er physical well-being becomes 
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of 
the race •••. Hence she [is] properly placed in a class by herself, and legislation designed 
for her protection may be sustained even when like legislation is not necessary for men 
and could not be sustained. 
300 U.S. 379, 394-95 (1937) (citation omitted). 
Even as late as the 1960's, the Court held that a woman's central role in raising a family 
permitted discriminatory legislation encouraging women to remain in the home. See, e.g., Hoyt 
v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1961) (upholding a state law excluding women from jury service 
absent an indication that they desired to serve). 
32. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (allowing jury selection that automatically 
excluded women absent an indication from them that they wanted to serve); Goesaert v. Cleary, 
335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute forbidding any female from working as a bartender unless 
she were the wife or daughter of a male owner of the establishment); West Coast Hotel v. Par-
rish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (allowing establishment of minimum wages for women but not for 
men); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitation on number of hours women 
were allowed to work); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that women were not 
guaranteed the right to vote by the fourteenth amendment) . 
. 33. See Loewy, supra note 5, at 87-95. 
34. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975) ("No longer is the female destined 
solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and 
the world of ideas."). 
35. "Traditionally, [gender-based] discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'roman-
tic paternalism' ... firmly rooted in our national consciousness .•.. " Frontiero v. Richardson, 
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1972) (plurality opinion). Such "romantic paternalism," while injurious, lacks 
the overt hostility commonly characteristic of other forms of discrimination. 
36. The strict scrutiny test is applied in cases involving fundamental rights or a suspect class. 
Under this test, discriminatory legislation will be struck down "unless shown to be necessary 
to promote a compelling governmental interest," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969) 
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to develop a middle-tier test commensurate with the unique aspects 
of gender discrimination. 37 
The Supreme Court initially developed this middle-tier analysis in 
Reed v. Reed. 38 There, the Court held that to withstand scrutiny, a 
gender-based classification must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must 
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation." 39 Although the Court did not 
expressly state that it was applying a new standard, 40 both the language 
and outcome41 of this opinion clearly indicated that the Court was 
developing a new test. · 
This new test was not fully refined or officially recognized until the 
Supreme Court decided Craig v. Boren42 in 1976. Applying what has 
become known as the ''middle-tier'' approach, the Court in Craig held 
that "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge, ... classifications by 
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives. " 43 This test demands 
(emphasis in original), and is the least drastic means of achieving that objective, San Antonio 
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973). For a thorough treatment of the strict 
scrutiny test, see L. TRIBE, supra note 5, §§ 16-6 to -18. 
37. With only a temporary detour, see infra, the evolvement toward a level of scrutiny 
somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny has been constant. See infra notes 38-43 
and accompanying text. The single exception was a brief flirtation with the strict scrutiny test 
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). In that case, a plurality 
of the Court found classifications based on gender to be inherently suspect and applied the strict 
scrutiny test to invalidate a statute presuming that wives of male members of the uniformed 
services were dependent but requiring husbands of female members to prove their dependence. 
38. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
39. Id. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
40. The Court actually purported to apply the rational basis test, holding that the classifica-
tion had to bear "a rational relationship to a state objective." 404 U.S. at 76. 
41. Professor Gunther suggests that had the rational basis test been used, the classification 
would have been upheld. The Court recogni2ed the legitimacy of the state's objective to reduce 
administrative disputes in appointing estate administrators, and since "clear priority classifica-
tions" were relevant to this objective, the classification should have been upheld. By striking 
down the classification, the Court demonstrated a "special sensitivity to sex as ·a classifying fac-
tor." Gunther, supra note 28, at 34. 
42. 429 U.S. 190, 210 & n. • (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
43. Id. at 197. The Court explicitly stated that Reed and subsequent cases required the ap-
plication of this test. Not all of the justices agreed, however. See id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) ("The Court's conclusion that a law which treats males less favorably than females 
'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement 
of those objectives' apparently comes out of thin air."). 
Since Craig, the Court has consistently applied this test. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women 
v. Hogan, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3339 (1982); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) 
(plurality opinion); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460 (1981); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. 
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85-86 (1979); Caban 
v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. 
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 
(1977) (plurality opinion); see also Rotsker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70-72 (1981) (recognizing 
the test in Craig, but giving extraordinary deference to Congress's determination of the best 
alternative because of the military context). 
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more than the rational basis test in two respects. First, the law must 
relate to an important government purpose; a higher standard than 
the legitimate purpose required by the rational basis test. Second, the 
test requires that the law have a substantial rather than merely reasonable 
relation to this objective. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE MIDDLE-TIER TEST 
TO THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY MODIECATION OF 
THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF NECESSARIES 
A. Important State Objective 
The first step in applying the middle-tier approach is determining 
whether the law examined serves an important state objective. 44 
Historically, the purpose of the doctrine of necessaries bas been to 
provide for needy wives by allowing them to obtain necessary goods 
and services where they are personally unable to pay for them. 45 This 
purpose has survived in the primary/secondary modification of the doc-
trine which continues to protect wives by holding them only secon-
darily liable for necessaries they purchase. Because the Supreme 9ourt 
has determined that providing support for needy spouses is an impor-
tant governmental objective, 46 the primary/ secondary test survives the 
44. In determining the purpose of legislation scrutinized under this test, the Court need not 
accept legislative assertions of purpose at face value when an examination of the legislative scheme 
and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose was not the goal of the legislation. See 
Weinburger v. \Viesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1974); Eisenstat v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 
448-49 (1972). 
45. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text; see also Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 
Wis. 2d 506, 510-11, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (1982) ("The heart of the common law rule is 
a concern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the individual members thereof • 
. . . The necessaries rule encourages the extension of credit to those who in an individual capacity 
may not have the ability to make these basic purchases."). Another possible, though unarticulated, 
purpose is the protection of creditors. For a discussion of the effectiveness of the necessaries 
doctrine in achieveing either of these objectives, see Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 
82 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1984). 
46. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 280 (1979). The Court has never explained exactly why support of needy spouses is an im-
portant governmental objective. One possibility is that the Court is concerned about the sanctity 
of marriage and the family. The institution of marriage would be undercut if individuals, although 
capable of providing for their spouses, were allowed to keep them in financial need. Cf. Grey, 
Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS. 83, 83-90 (1980) (arguing 
that the Court's decisions involving a constitutional right of privacy were concerned not ,vith 
an individual's right to use contraceptives or procure an abortion, but rather were, "like the 
general run of the Court's decisions in this area, dedicated to the cause of social stability through 
the reinforcement of traditional institutions"). 
For other important objectives underlying the Court's decisions, see, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior 
Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (prevention of illegitimate pregnancies); Califano v. Westcott, 443 
U.S. 76 (1979) (providing benefits to children deprived of basic sustenance because of a parent's 
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first step of the middle-tier analysis. 
B. Substantial Relation to the Objective 
The second step of the middle-tier test requires that the primary/secon-
dary modification be substantially related to achieving the objective 
of protecting needy spouses. The modification fails to meet this part 
of the test in three ways. First, even under the lax rational basis test, 
the modification is not sufficiently inclusive to meet the constitutional 
mandate of fairly benefiting and burdening all persons similarly situated. 
Second, even if the modification did meet the requirements of the ra-
tional basis test, it would nonetheless fail the stricter fit requirements 
of the substantial relation test.47 Finally, even assuming it could meet 
these stricter fit requirements, it still could not be justified given that 
there is a gender-neutral rule available that would be equally effective 
in achieving the objective. 
1. Underinclusion - classification fails to achieve objective- Leading 
commentators have suggested that, to meet the reasonable relation re-
quirement of the rational basis test, a classification must include "all 
persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the 
law. " 48 Insofar as the purpose of the rule holding husbands primarily 
liable is to help needy spouses, it is evident that the classification is 
"underinclusive" because it fails to include needy husbands. 49 
unemployment); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) {compensation for past economic 
discrimination against females); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) {protection of public health 
and safety); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) {providing children deprived of one 
parent the opportunity for the personal attention of the other parent); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
419 U.S. 498 (1975) {fair and equitable advancement programs in the armed forces). 
47. Because the equal protection clause does not require that all persons be treated alike, 
but only that similarly situated persons be treated alike, see Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 
(1940), gender classifications have been upheld where it was shown that the classification "realistical-
ly reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances," Michael M. 
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) {plurality opinion). Thus, for example, the Court 
has upheld gender classifications designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination against 
women since men and women are not similarly situated with respect to this discrimination. See, 
e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) {per curiam); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 
498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The Court has refused, however, to uphold 
classifications not grounded in any dissimilarity but rather based on "archaic and overbroad 
generalizations" that assume a wife's dependency on her husband and therefore do not reflect 
contemporary society. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). This refusal is based 
on the Court's heightened concern that gender-based classifications be closely related to their 
objective. 
48. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 31 CwF. L. REv. 341,346 (1949). 
49. The classification is also "overinclusive" because it benefits some non-needy wives. 
Although commentators have suggested that "overinclusiveness" is a greater evil than 
"underinclusiveness," see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 
1086-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 
351, the Supreme Court has held that "overinclusiveness" does not render a classification un-
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Although ''underinclusiveness'' is said to be prima facie evidence that 
the classification is not reasonable, 50 the Court occasionally has upheld 
such classifications.51 The Court's rationale in these instances is generally 
that practical considerations prevent requiring legislatures to attack all 
aspects of a problem at once. 52 For example, if a problem is too large 
to be remedied all at once, the legislature may be allowed discretion 
to choose which aspects of the problem are most serious. 53 Such is 
not the case with helping needy spouses, however. The only practical 
consideration involved in holding husbands primarily liable is the ad-
ministrative convenience of assuming wives are dependent rather than 
requiring a determination in each case as to which, if either, spouse 
is actually dependent. The Court, however, has held that the ad-
ministrative inconvenience of having to hold hearings is not sufficient 
justification to support a gender-based classification. 54 Consequently, 
the Court is unlikely to uphold any classification that fails to include 
needy husbands. 
2. Statistics insufficient to justify gender as proxy- Even assuming 
that the primary/secondary modification is sufficiently inclusive to 
satisfy the rational basis test, it nonetheless fails to meet the stricter 
fit requirements used in evaluating gender-based classifications. Under 
the middle-tier test, where gender is used as a proxy for some other 
basis of classification, it must accurately reflect this other basis. 55 The 
reason is clear: use of gender as an inaccurate proxy unfairly stereotyp~ 
all females with a characteristic regardless of how many actually possess 
constitutional, see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Therefore, the benefit afforded some 
non-needy wives is irrelevant for equal protection purposes. 
50. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 348; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471, 519 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Such underinclusiveness manifests 'a prima 
facie violation of the equal protection requirement of reasonable classification' •..• ") (quoting 
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48). 
51. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (sellers of ready-to-wear 
glasses need not be subjected to regulations imposed on opticians); Railway Express Agency, 
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (vehicles advertising products of the vehicle's owner 
may be exempted from regulation forbidding use of advertising vehicles on city streets); Semler 
v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (regulations forbidding dentists 
to advertise need not extend to other classes of professionals). 
52. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,495 (1974) (" '[T]he Equal Protection Clause 
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not 
attacking the problem at all."') (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970)); 
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental 
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935); L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-4, at 997; Tussman & ten-
Broek, supra note 48, at 348-49; Equal Protection, supra note 49, at 1084-85. 
53. See L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-4, at 997; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 48, at 349; 
Equal Protection, supra note 49, at 1084-85. 
54. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688- 89 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71, 76 (1971) ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the 
other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind 
of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause .... "). 
55. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976). 
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it. 56 Thus, by using gender as a proxy for need, the primary/secon-
dary modification labels all wives as "dependent," and thereby un-
constitutionally demeans the efforts of those wives who do work. 57 
In addition, this process of stigmatization often has the negative ef -
f ect of perpetuating traditional stereotypic views of women. 58 By assum-
ing wives are dependent and treating them as dependent, a classifica--
tion reinforces the view that females need special protection. Moreover, 
using classifications designed to give this protection makes it difficult 
for women to break out of their stereotypic roles. 59 Protective classifica-
tions have the effect of denying females the opportunity to become 
fully responsible persons, 60 and reaffirm the commonly held belief 
that they need special protection. The entire process becomes a vicious 
circle working to insure that women never attain truly equal status. 61 
These potentially adverse effects must be minimized by requiring that 
gender be used as a proxy only where it accurately reflects the underly-
ing classification. In the case of the primary/secondary modification, 
however, statistics do not show a close enough correlation between 
gender and dependence to justify the use of a gender classification. 
56. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973) (plurality opinion) ("statutory 
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of 
females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individuals members"). 
57. The Court has repeatedly held that gender-based classifications may not operate to denigrate 
the female wage earner. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 148 (1980); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). 
58. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, l02 S. Ct. 3331, 3333 (1982) (policy of ex-
cluding males from nursing program "tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as 
an exclusively woman's job"); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) ("Legislative classifications 
which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforc-
ing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special protection."); Stan-
ton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975) (To argue that female children do not need child support 
as Jong as male children because they do not go to school as long "is to be self-serving: if the 
female is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school 
as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing 
society has long imposed."). See generally L. TRmE, supra note 5, § 16-25; Harzenski & Weckesser, 
The Case for Strictly Scrutinizing Gender-Based Separate But Equal Classification Schemes, 
52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 472-78 (1979); The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REv. 49, 100-03 
(1975). 
59. See Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 58, at 469-71. 
60. Id. at 469. 
61. Cf. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 55 (1977): 
The law ... has long been one of the chief instruments for assuring the dependency 
of women. • . . If a woman is, for some legal purposes, a thing, if the law treats her 
in some contexts as incapable of behaving as an adult, if the law reminds her at every 
turn that she is a dependent - then is it any wonder that she internalizes the stigma 
of inferiority and assumes herself to be less than fully human? ... A woman who 
has been brought to think that she is incapable of filling a particular soda! role is 
incapable. 
_(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
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Although, on the average, women tend to earn less than men, 62 it does 
not necessarily follow that the wife is always, or even usually, depen-
dent on her husband and thus needy. On the contrary, recent statistics 
indicate that in fifty-two percent of all married-couple families, both 
the husband and wife work. 63 Consequently, in fifty-two percent of 
all families, the wife is at most only partially dependent upon her hus-
band. Moreover, in almost three and one-half percent of married-couple 
families, the wife is the only wage earner. 64 Although this seems to 
be a small percentage, it means that potentially 1,707,000 husbands 
are totally dependent upon their wives. 65 
Based on these statistics, it appears that using gender as a proxy 
for need may be accurate only slightly more than forty-four percent 
of the time. In the other fifty-six percent of cases, however, where 
the wife is at least a joint wage earner and in some cases the sole wage 
earner, she is being unfairly branded with the label ''dependent,•• com-
plete with its stereotypic and degrading effects. 66 Given these effects 
in such a potentially large percentage of cases, gender is hardly a suf-
ficiently accurate proxy for need to meet the substantial relation 
requirement. 
3. A vai/ability of a gender-neutral alternative- Even assuming that 
gender is an accurate proxy for need and that holding husbands primarily 
liable does achieve the desired result, the classification still cannot be 
upheld. Where a gender-neutral rule is available that would achieve 
the desired objective, a gender-based rule cannot be employed. 67 
62. See Rytina, Occupational segregation and earnings differences by sex, MoNnn.Y LAB. 
REv., Jan. 1981, at 49, 49 & n.l. 
63. See supra note 13. 
64. See supra note 16. 
65. Id. Some account must be taken here of those husbands who do not work but who are 
independently wealthy and thus not dependent on their working wives. Account must also be 
taken of working husbands who may be partially dependent. 
66. This is not to say that wives who are, in fact, dependent should feel any degradation 
because of their status. The degradation occurs when those wives who are not dependent are 
labeled dependent, thus insinuating that the work they do is insignificant. 
67. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268, 283 (1979). This rule was apparently contradicted in Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 
U.S. 464, 473 (1981), where a plurality stated that it is not necessary to prefer a gender-neutral 
rule if a non-neutral rule - drawn within constitutional limits - is available. Obviously, the 
plurality in Michael M. did not feel that the existence of a gender-neutral rule is relevant in 
determining whether a classification is sufficiently precise to be constitutional. This contradicts 
the majority decisions of O" and Wengler. 
To reach the conclusion that a gender-neutral rule need not be preferred, the plurality relied 
on a footnote in the majority opinion of Kahn v. Shevin. This footnote states that it is insuffi-
cient to argue that the "[l)egislature could have drafted the statute differently, so that its purpose 
would have been accomplished more precisely. . . . [T]he issue . . . is not whether the statute 
could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the lines chosen ... are within constitutional 
limitations." 416 U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974). It is apparent that this footnote was improperly 
relied upon because it was not meant to apply to the question of preferring a gender-neutral 
rule over a gender-based one. Rather, the footnote in Kahn was in response to the argument . 
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At least three gender-neutral alternatives are available that would 
achieve the objective of helping needy spouses. 68 First, the husband 
and wife could be held jointly and severally liable. Second, courts might 
hold the spouse who incurred the debt primarily liable and the other 
spouse secondarily liable. 69 Finally, liability could be imposed on 
whichever spouse was better able to handle the financial burden. 10 Which 
of these alternatives is preferable is irrelevant to the question of the 
constitutionality of the gender-based classification. The mere existence 
of a viable gender-neutral rule indicates that the gender-based rule of 
holding husbands primarily liable cannot be substantially related to 
the objective of helping needy spouses. 
CONCLUSION 
The common law doctrine of necessaries undoubtedly had a legitimate 
basis at one time. No longer, however, can the assumption of a wife's 
dependency constitutionally sustain a gender-based classification such 
as the primary/secondary modification. Not only does this modifica-
tion ignore dependent husbands, it also demeans the efforts of work-
ing wives by perpetuating the stereotypic view that the wife is the depen-
dent spouse. In addition, there are several gender-neutral alternatives 
available that would achieve the desired objective of assisting needy 
spouses. These considerations indicate that the primary/secondary 
modification unconstitutionally denies the equal protection rights of 
men and women. Insofar as the modification is unconstitutional, it 
is not a legitimate means of reforming the common law doctrine of 
necessaries. Any such reformation must be gender neutral to be 
constitutional. 
-Debra S. Betteridge 
that the statute was not substantially related to the achievement of the state's objective because 
it was overinclusive - it benefited some who did not need the benefit and it could have been 
drawn to exclude these people. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, the footnote should 
not be read as saying that it is not necessary to use a gender-neutral rule if one is available. 
68. A fourth alternative, that of holding neither spouse liable for necessary debts incurred 
by the other, while gender neutral, would not advance the objective of helping needy spouses 
obtain what they need because there would be no one to hold liable if they were unable to pay. 
69. For those states that apply these two alternatives, see supra notes 19 & 21 and accompa-
nying text. 
70. At the present time, no state has adopted this alternative. Use of this alternative would 
require a case-by-case determination of which spouse could better afford the cost. Because of 
its administrative inconvenience, this rule has been rejected in favor of the gender-based rule 
requiring no such determination. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 525, 314 
N. W .2d 326, 335-36 (1982) (Abrahamson, J ., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Yet because 
the Court has held that administrative inconvenience is not a sufficient reason to prefer one 
gender over another, see supra note 54 and accompanying text, the rule remains a viable alter-
native available for use in achieving the state's objective of helping needy spouses. 
